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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3324 
_____________ 
 
JOHN OLMEDO-SERRANO, 
 
                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                          
District Court No. 2-13-cv-03618 
District Judge: The Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 19, 2016 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 5, 2017)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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John Olmedo-Serrano appeals from the District Court’s order approving and 
adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, which 
recommended dismissing Olmedo-Serrano’s petition for writ of habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We issued a certificate of appealability as to Olmedo-
Serrano’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel following his guilty plea.  
We will affirm the District Court’s denial of that claim but on different grounds 
than those upon which the District Court relied. 
I. 
In 2007, Olmedo-Serrano was arrested and charged with various criminal 
offenses connected to a drive-by shooting, which resulted in the crippling of one 
victim.  Olmedo-Serrano confessed to the charged conduct.  Represented by 
counsel, he pleaded guilty to attempted murder, aggravated assault, and conspiracy 
to commit murder.  Olmedo-Serrano’s guilty plea was “open,” meaning that the 
guilty plea contained no agreed-upon recommendation for sentencing.  Olmedo-
Serrano’s guilty plea subjected him to the following sentencing ranges: 120 to 480 
months for attempted murder, 42 to 54 months for aggravated assault, and 78 to 96 
months for conspiracy to commit murder.   
After considering counsels’ arguments, the sentencing court imposed a 
sentence of 12 1/2 to 25 years of incarceration, with 25 years of supervised 
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probation.  Olmedo-Serrano did not object to this sentence.  On the record, counsel 
informed Olmedo-Serrano that he had “ten days to file a motion asking the court to 
reconsider [his] sentence and . . . thirty days to file an appeal with the Superior 
[C]ourt.”  JA68.  No motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed. 
Nine months after sentencing, Olmedo-Serrano filed a pro se petition for 
relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 9541 et seq.  Among other allegations, Olmedo-Serrano’s PCRA petition 
claimed ineffective assistance for his trial counsel’s “fail[ure] to file a motion for 
re-consideration of sentence when he had assured [Olmedo-Serrano] he would 
file.”  JA104.  The PCRA petition, however, offered no explanation for why a 
motion for reconsideration was warranted or what arguments the motion for 
reconsideration would have raised.  It simply noted that Olmedo-Serrano expected 
a lower sentence than he received and that his “sentence was manifestly 
excessive.”  Id.  The PCRA petition also made no mention of a failure by trial 
counsel to appeal Olmedo-Serrano’s sentence, a failure by trial counsel to discuss 
appealing the sentence, or any request by Olmedo-Serrano to appeal. 
Following the petition’s filing, the PCRA Court appointed counsel to 
represent Olmedo-Serrano.  Shortly after that appointment, Olmedo-Serrano filed 
an amended pro se PCRA petition, which reiterated only some of the allegations 
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from the original petition.  The amended pro se petition did not raise trial 
counsel’s failure to file a requested motion for reconsideration or an appeal. 
PCRA counsel subsequently filed a Finley letter, stating that Olmedo-
Serrano’s petition lacked merit.  See Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213, 215 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).  Olmedo-Serrano objected to PCRA counsel’s letter and 
noted again that his trial counsel had failed to file a motion for reconsideration on 
his behalf.  The PCRA Court then informed Olmedo-Serrano by letter of its 
intention to dismiss his petition.  Olmedo-Serrano responded to the PCRA Court’s 
notice but again did not raise trial counsel’s failure to file either a motion for 
reconsideration or an appeal.  Shortly thereafter, the PCRA Court dismissed 
Olmedo-Serrano’s petition.   
After the PCRA Court dismissed his petition, Olmedo-Serrano filed a pro se 
“Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal” with the PCRA Court, again 
making no mention of any failure to file an appeal, any failure by trial counsel to 
discuss an appeal, or any request by Olmedo-Serrano to appeal.  The PCRA Court 
addressed Olmedo-Serrano’s filing in a written opinion.  In relevant part, the 
PCRA Court observed that Olmedo-Serrano’s claim “that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion for reconsideration” was “without merit.”  
JA141.  The PCRA Court reasoned that “[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective 
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for failing to pursue a meritless claim and Appellant has failed to establish beyond 
a preponderance of the evidence that he was prejudiced by counsel’s act or 
omission.  Error was not committed.”  Id.   
Olmedo-Serrano then appealed the dismissal of his PCRA petition to 
Pennsylvania’s Superior Court.  On appeal, Olmedo-Serrano argued that (1) trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for reconsideration, (2) trial 
counsel also caused him to lose his “direct appeal rights” by failing to file the 
motion for reconsideration, and (3) PCRA counsel was ineffective for filing the 
no-merit Finley letter.  JA158.  As to the allegations of trial counsel’s ineffective 
assistance for failing to file a motion for reconsideration and causing him to lose 
his “appeal rights,” the Superior Court concluded that Olmedo-Serrano had waived 
those claims by failing to raise them in both his original PCRA petition and his 
response to the PCRA Court’s notice of intent to dismiss.  For the claim relating to 
PCRA counsel, the Superior Court determined that counsel was not ineffective for 
filing a no-merit Finley letter.  In doing so, it observed that the claims underlying 
Olmedo-Serrano’s PCRA petition, including his claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion for reconsideration, were “without merit.”  
JA187.  The Superior Court consequently affirmed the dismissal of Olmedo-
Serrano’s PCRA petition in full.  See Commonwealth v. Olmedo-Serrano, No. 
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2836 EDA 2011, 2013 WL 11289218, at *4–5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2013). 
Following that dismissal, Olmedo-Serrano filed his current petition for writ 
of habeas corpus pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1  The petition raised only an 
ineffective assistance claim for trial counsel’s failure to file a motion for 
reconsideration and noted that, “[a]s a result” of this failure, Olmedo-Serrano “did 
not file a direct appeal.”  JA23.  Olmedo-Serrano’s § 2254 petition made no 
allegation that trial counsel failed to discuss an appeal or that he even requested 
trial counsel to file an appeal. 
Reviewing the § 2254 petition, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and 
Recommendation, concluding in relevant part that Olmedo-Serrano’s claims 
related to the motion for reconsideration and appeal were procedurally defaulted.  
While disagreeing with the Superior Court that Olmedo-Serrano failed to raise 
those allegations in his original petition, the Magistrate Judge nonetheless 
determined that the claims were procedurally defaulted because Olmedo-Serrano 
failed to raise them in his amended PCRA petition.  Olmedo-Serrano objected to 
the Report and Recommendation, again making no mention of any failure to file a 
requested appeal by trial counsel.  The District Court approved and adopted the 
                                                 
1 In his § 2254 petition, Olmedo-Serrano also raised a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel regarding his guilty plea.  We did not grant a certificate 
of appealability as to that claim and therefore will not review it now. 
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Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation in full.   
II.2 
Because we granted a certificate of appealability only with regard to 
whether the District Court properly denied Olmedo-Serrano’s claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective for “failing to file a motion for reconsideration of [his] 
sentence or take other action to preserve his appeal rights,” our review is limited to 
that single issue.  JA15.  We conclude that the denial was proper but for reasons 
different than those relied on by the District Court.   
First, to the extent Olmedo-Serrano now argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to appeal his sentence, that claim is procedurally defaulted 
because Olmedo-Serrano failed to raise it in either his original or amended PCRA 
petition.  Second, assuming no procedural default occurred as to Olmedo-
Serrano’s claim that trial counsel failed to file a motion for reconsideration, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s dismissal of that claim on the merits was not 
unreasonable. 
A. 
Olmedo-Serrano’s claim that trial counsel failed to file an appeal is 
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over Olmedo-Serrano’s petition under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253. 
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procedurally defaulted.   
“Where a state court refuses to consider a petitioner’s claims because of a 
violation of state procedural rules, a federal habeas court is barred by the 
procedural default doctrine from considering the claims. . . .”  Johnson v. Pinchak, 
392 F.3d 551, 556 (3d Cir. 2004).  Here, the Superior Court determined that, based 
on state procedural rules, Olmedo-Serrano had waived his claim of ineffective 
assistance related to the failure to file an appeal by failing to raise the claim before 
the PCRA Court.  See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 724 A.2d 916, 921 n.5 (Pa. 
1999) (concluding that a petitioner’s failure “to raise [a claim] in the PCRA 
petitions presented to the PCRA Court” made the claim “not eligible for appellate 
review”); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9544(b) (“[A]n issue is waived if the 
petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so . . . in a prior state postconviction 
proceeding[.]”). 
Olmedo-Serrano did not allege in either of his pro se PCRA petitions that 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal.  Rather, his original 
petition stated only that trial counsel “fail[ed] to file a motion for re-consideration 
of sentence when he had assured [Olmedo-Serrano] he would file.”  JA104.  But 
see JA117–21 (amended petition making no mention of trial counsel’s failure to 
file a motion for reconsideration).  A motion for reconsideration, though, is not an 
9 
 
appeal.  See, e.g., United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that a claim for failing to file an objection is unlikely to “provide notice 
of” a claim for failure to file an appeal); see also United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 
333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing Craycraft as “compelling precedent”).  Nor is 
a motion for reconsideration a prerequisite for an appeal; rather, a motion for 
reconsideration is simply an additional means by which to raise an objection under 
Pennsylvania law.  See Pa. R. Crim. P. 720(B)(1)(c) (“Issues raised before or 
during trial shall be deemed preserved for appeal whether or not the defendant 
elects to file a post-sentence motion on those issues.”); see also Commonwealth v. 
Reeves, 778 A.2d 691, 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (“[I]ssues challenging the 
discretionary aspects of sentencing must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by 
raising the claim during the sentencing proceedings.” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)); cf. Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 663 A.2d 790, 792 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) 
(concluding that, because an issue was not preserved during trial or after trial 
through a motion for reconsideration, the issue on appeal was waived).  Therefore, 
the Superior Court’s conclusion that Olmedo-Serrano waived his ineffective 
assistance claim related to filing an appeal bars review of that claim. 
In response to the invitation in our certificate of appealability, Olmedo-
Serrano argues for the first time that the procedural default here should be excused 
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under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).  That argument is unpersuasive.   
In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that “attorney error in [initial review] 
collateral proceedings may sometimes establish cause for the default of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”3  Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 404 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315).  The Supreme Court characterized 
this exception as “narrow.”  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
Under Martinez, Olmedo-Serrano must demonstrate that an error by PCRA 
counsel “amounts to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Id. at 
1324.  “Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed 
by the familiar two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington.”  Jacobs v. Horn, 395 
F.3d 92, 102 (3d Cir. 2005).  Strickland’s two-prong test proceeds as follows: 
“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To be deficient, 
counsel’s performance must fail to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.  
                                                 
3  The Supreme Court also stated that, for this exception to apply, state law must 
require that “claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel . . . be raised in an 
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Id. at 688; see also id. at 689 (observing that courts “must indulge a strong 
presumption” that counsel was effective).  “At all points, judicial scrutiny of 
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”  Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 
15, 17 (2009) (per curiam) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
Olmedo-Serrano does little to explain how his PCRA counsel was deficient.  
His arguments essentially boil down to the proposition that counsel should have 
raised a claim related to a separate factual matter that Olmedo-Serrano never 
raised, despite his numerous filings before the PCRA Court.  None of Olmedo-
Serrano’s filings mention a failure by trial counsel to file an appeal, a failure by 
trial counsel to discuss an appeal, or that Olmedo-Serrano even requested trial 
counsel to file an appeal.  Rather, his filings repeatedly assert trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion for reconsideration after his sentence was 
higher than he expected.  In his § 2254 petition, Olmedo-Serrano similarly makes 
no allegation that trial counsel failed to file a requested appeal.  Even before this 
Court, Olmedo-Serrano makes no argument that trial counsel failed to file an 
appeal he requested. 
PCRA counsel also discussed the petition with Olmedo-Serrano, particularly 
                                                                                                                                                             
initial-review collateral proceeding.”  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.  Pennsylvania 
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Olmedo-Serrano’s allegations relating to the higher-than-expected sentence.  
Despite that discussion, PCRA counsel’s Finley letter provides no indication that 
Olmedo-Serrano expressed a desire to bring a failure-to-appeal claim or that 
Olmedo-Serrano had requested trial counsel to file an appeal.  Olmedo-Serrano’s 
objection to the Finley letter and the PCRA Court’s notice of intent to dismiss 
similarly demonstrate that no such desire was expressed.   
Thus, while Olmedo-Serrano now asserts that he wished to file a failure-to-
appeal claim in his PCRA petition, he took no step toward making that claim: he 
did not raise it in his initial petition, in his amended petition, in discussions with 
PCRA counsel, or in any of his post-Finley letter filings.  Under Strickland’s 
highly deferential review of counsel’s performance, we conclude that Olmedo-
Serrano fails to demonstrate that PCRA counsel was deficient and thus cannot 
show that his case fits within Martinez’s limited exception to procedural default. 
B. 
Olmedo-Serrano contends that he properly raised an ineffective assistance 
claim for trial counsel’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration.  We are 
uncertain that this claim was procedurally defaulted, as the District Court 
concluded, because Olmedo-Serrano raised the claim in his original PCRA 
                                                                                                                                                             
law so requires.  See Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 124 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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petition.  Even assuming that Olmedo-Serrano properly raised that claim, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s dismissal of that claim was not an unreasonable 
application of federal law. 
“The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) dictates the 
manner in which we conduct our review.”  Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
834 F.3d 263, 280 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).  Under AEDPA, federal habeas courts 
cannot grant relief “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 
State court” unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that . . . involved an 
unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application of federal law” 
if the decision “identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . . but unreasonably 
applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.”  Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000).  That said, “even a strong case for relief does not mean 
the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.”  Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).  Rather, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks 
merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ 
on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”  Id. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. 
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).  “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is 
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because it was meant to be.”  Id. at 102. 
Here, the Pennsylvania Superior Court adjudicated Olmedo-Serrano’s 
ineffective assistance claim related to the motion for reconsideration on the merits.  
When the Superior Court examined Olmedo-Serrano’s ineffective assistance claim 
relating to his PCRA counsel, it analyzed the underlying claims in Olmedo-
Serrano’s PCRA petition, including his motion-for-reconsideration claim.  In 
doing so, the Superior Court concluded that the motion-for-reconsideration claim 
was “without merit.”  JA187 (“[T]he trial court, and now our Court, have both 
conducted independent reviews of Appellant’s claims and find them to be without 
merit.”); see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (“By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation 
of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the 
exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2).  There is no text in the statute requiring a 
statement of reasons.”); Collins v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 548 
(3d Cir. 2014) (observing that “cursory statements” constitute an adjudication on 
the merits). 
To ascertain whether that merits decision by the Superior Court was an 
unreasonable application of federal law, we must “determine what arguments or 
theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; 
and then [we] must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that 
15 
 
those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision 
of” the Supreme Court.  Dennis, 834 F.3d at 282 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 
102).   
Olmedo-Serrano argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to file a 
motion for reconsideration to have the sentencing court better explain the reasons 
for his sentence and that this failure to file the motion prejudiced him.4  As noted 
earlier, we evaluate claims of ineffective assistance through a two-prong approach, 
analyzing counsel’s performance for deficiency and whether that deficiency 
prejudiced the defendant.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Making the prejudice 
inquiry, we “must ask if [Olmedo-Serrano] has met the burden of showing that the 
decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.”  
Id. at 696.  Here, fairminded jurists could not disagree as to whether the failure to 
file a motion for reconsideration was prejudicial to Olmedo-Serrano because he 
has not met his burden to demonstrate that filing a motion for reconsideration 
would have altered his sentence.   
                                                 
4 Olmedo-Serrano failed to properly preserve these arguments for appeal, having 
not raised them first before the District Court.  See United States v. Melendez, 55 
F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 1995) (declining to address argument first raised on 
appeal); see also Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining to 
consider arguments related to § 2254 petition that were not made before the 
District Court).  Notably, he did not explain to the state habeas courts the basis for 
a motion for reconsideration, which may explain the state court’s brevity.   
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Olmedo-Serrano faced recommended sentencing ranges of 120 to 480 
months for attempted murder, 42 to 54 months for aggravated assault, and 78 to 96 
months for conspiracy to commit murder.  With those ranges as background, the 
sentencing court considered extensive argument as to the appropriate sentence for 
Olmedo-Serrano.   
Olmedo-Serrano’s trial counsel requested a sentence of 5 to 10 years of 
incarceration for Olmedo-Serrano.  In support of this below-guidelines request, 
trial counsel argued that Olmedo-Serrano’s criminal history score overstated his 
criminal history and noted several factors militating against a lengthy sentence, 
including that a licensed psychologist identified Olmedo-Serrano as learning 
disabled and possessing an IQ of 70, that Olmedo-Serrano had a difficult family 
situation and was “in and out of institutions since the age of 12,” that he took 
responsibility for his conduct and pleaded guilty, that he offered to assist in the 
prosecution of other individuals connected to his crimes, and that Olmedo-Serrano 
was young.   
After hearing from Olmedo-Serrano’s counsel, the sentencing court 
considered arguments from the State.  The State first presented the testimony of a 
victim’s mother.  She described the impact the shooting had on her son and her 
family.  The State also contended that Olmedo-Serrano appreciated the gravity of 
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his offense and emphasized that Olmedo-Serrano’s recent criminal history 
included a conviction for gun possession.  The State thus requested a sentence of 
15 to 30 years of incarceration for Olmedo-Serrano.   
The sentencing court ultimately imposed 12 1/2 to 25 years of incarceration.  
That sentence was just above the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines’ 10-year 
recommendation and well below the 40-year statutory maximum facing Olmedo-
Serrano.  The sentence was also below the State’s requested sentence of 15 to 30 
years.   
Given that background, Olmedo-Serrano fails to explain how a better 
explanation from the sentencing court, following a motion for reconsideration, 
would have changed his sentence.  With the statutory ranges at issue, the 
sentencing court’s consideration of extensive sentencing arguments, and Olmedo-
Serrano’s failure to explain how further explanation from the sentencing court 
would have changed his sentence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that further 
explanation from the sentencing court would not have altered his sentence, and 
thus the Superior Court’s ruling that the claim lacked merit was not unreasonable.  
See Dennis, 834 F.3d at 281 (“A rule’s unreasonable application corresponds to 
the specificity of the rule itself: ‘[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway 
courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” (alteration in 
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original) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101)).  Thus, even if the issue were not 
procedurally defaulted, Olmedo-Serrano’s assertion that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion for reconsideration does not provide a basis 
for relief. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court 
denying Olmedo-Serrano’s petition.  
